The Doctrine of Relation Back refers to whether an act done before the extraction of the grant of letters of administration can bind, protect or benefit the deceased’s estate.

An administrator ordinarily has no authority to deal with the estate until the sealed grant of letters of administration is extracted. The doctrine of relation back is a narrow exception. Once the grant is obtained, the doctrine may treat the administrator’s title as relating back to the date of the deceased’s death.

However, this does not validate everything done before the grant. Considerations include the purpose of the act, whether it objectively benefited the estate, the identity of the person who later became administrator and the ratification of every joint administrator.

The default position before a grant is extracted

Where a person dies intestate, section 37(1) of the Probate and Administration Act 1934 (the “PAA“) provides that the deceased’s real and personal estate vests in the Public Trustee. Under section 37(4) of the PAA, that vesting ceases when administration is granted in respect of the estate.

There is also an important distinction between the grant being made and the sealed grant being extracted. In Phoa Eugene (personal representative of the estate of Evelyn Phoa (alias Lauw Evelyn Siew Chiang), deceased and personal representative of the estate of William Phoa, deceased) v Oey Liang Ho (alias Henry Kasenda) (sole executor of the estate of Wirio Kasenda (alias Oey Giok Tjeng), deceased) and others [2024] 4 SLR 1493 (“Phoa Eugene“) at [52], the High Court explained that the property may vest in the administrator upon the grant, but the administrator obtains the authority to administer the estate only upon extraction of the sealed grant.

Therefore, the starting point is simple. If the alleged administrator acted before extracting the sealed grant, that person ordinarily lacked authority to deal with the estate.

What is the doctrine of relation back?

The leading Singapore authority is the Court of Appeal decision in Tacplas Property Services Pte Ltd v Lee Peter Michael (administrator of the estate of Lee Chong Miow, deceased) [2000] 1 SLR(R) 159 (“Tacplas“).

At [44], the Court of Appeal explained that the doctrine allows the administrator’s title to relate back to the time of the deceased’s death. Its purpose is to give validity to certain acts done before the extraction of the grant.

The doctrine commonly operates in two situations:

  1. It may allow the administrator, after obtaining the grant, to recover estate property from a person who wrongfully dealt with that property between the death and the grant.
  2. It may validate a pre-grant disposition made for the benefit of the estate or in the due course of administration, provided the necessary ratification is present.

These situations are distinct. A question about recovering a an asset is not analysed in precisely the same manner as a question about enforcing a contract entered into before the grant.

The facts and decision in Tacplas

The dispute concerned an agreement relating to the sale of property belonging to an estate. Christina Lee entered into the agreement before the grant of letters of administration was extracted. She later became one of two joint administrators.

The Court of Appeal first held that Christina Lee had no authority to enter into the agreement before the grant was extracted. The court then considered whether the doctrine of relation back could validate the agreement.

The agreement was objectively beneficial to the estate. It allowed an appeal concerning the property to be pursued without the estate bearing the costs, and it protected and preserved the estate’s assets. Christina Lee was also treated as having implicitly ratified the agreement after she became an administrator.

That was not enough. The other joint administrator refused to ratify the agreement. Since joint administrators must act jointly to bind the estate, the Court of Appeal held at [55] that all the administrators had to ratify the earlier act. The agreement therefore did not bind the estate under the doctrine.

The requirements when a pre-grant disposition is involved

Where the question concerns a contract, sale or other disposition made before the grant, the analysis may be organised into the following limbs.

Limb 1: Was the act objectively for the benefit of the estate?

The expected administrator’s honest belief is not conclusive. The court asks objectively whether the act benefited the estate. In Tacplas, the relevant time was the time at which the agreement was made.

The concept of benefit is not confined to preventing the immediate loss of an asset. It can include an arrangement that protects, preserves or enables the recovery of estate property. An act done in the due course of administration may also fall within the doctrine.

Limb 2: Was the act ratified after the grant?

The act must be ratified by the person who subsequently has authority to bind the estate. Ratification may be express or, on sufficiently clear facts, implied.

If there are joint administrators, every administrator whose concurrence is needed to bind the estate must ratify the act. One administrator cannot use the doctrine to obtain greater authority before appointment than he or she would possess after appointment.

Additional limits

The doctrine cannot be used to disturb rights that a third party validly acquired during the interval between death and the grant. It also cannot give the administrator title to property that ceased to exist during that interval.

Further, the doctrine is protective. It is not a general power to rewrite the deceased’s estate plan or the statutory scheme of intestate succession.

The doctrine can support recovery for wrongs against the estate

The more recent application of the doctrine is Tan Cheng Cheng and others v Shamlal s/o Tuppani Bisaysar and another [2024] 5 SLR 1150.

The administrators sued in conversion over a watch that allegedly belonged to the deceased. The alleged dealings occurred in the period between the deceased’s death and the grant of administration.

At [32] to [33], the High Court affirmed that the doctrine may give the administrators the necessary right to possession so that they can recover against a person who seized or converted estate property before the grant. Without the doctrine, a wrong against the estate during this period might have no effective remedy.

This is the protective rationale of the doctrine in its clearest form.

The doctrine cannot cure an action commenced without capacity

An administrator cannot commence proceedings before obtaining letters of administration and rely on the doctrine later.

That is incorrect.

In Teo Gim Tiong v Krishnasamy Pushpavathi (legal representative of the estate of Maran s/o Kannakasabai, deceased) [2014] 4 SLR 15 at [23] to [30], the Court of Appeal explained that an administrator’s title to sue depends on the grant. A person who commences an action in the capacity of administrator before obtaining the grant acts in a capacity that he or she does not possess. The subsequent grant cannot use relation back to make that action competent.

Phoa Eugene applied the same principle to a personal representative who had not extracted a resealed foreign grant in Singapore before commencing the action. The failure was not merely a procedural irregularity that could be repaired later.

The broad statements in Phoa Eugene that relation back does not apply in Singapore must be read in this litigation context. The decision concerned an attempt to cure proceedings commenced without the necessary representative capacity. It did not abolish the doctrine described in Tacplas. This is confirmed by Tan Cheng Cheng, decided later in 2024, which applied the doctrine to wrongful dealings with estate property.

The doctrine cannot change the beneficiaries’ statutory entitlements

Another example of the limit is in Kuek Siang Wei and another v Kuek Siew Chew [2015] 5 SLR 357. The High Court had rejected an attempt to rely on relation back to validate a family arrangement that varied the beneficiaries’ entitlements under the Intestate Succession Act 1967 (the “ISA”). At [40], the Court of Appeal noted that the High Court judge had rejected the appellants’ argument that the doctrine of relation back validated the Deed of Family Arrangement. Although the doctrine could deem an administrator to have authority from the date of the deceased’s death to deal with estate assets before the letters of administration were extracted, it could not allow the administrator to vary the beneficiaries’ entitlements under the intestacy regime. The estate therefore had to be distributed according to the ISA because the Letter of Consent and the Deed of Consent were invalid.

The point is consistent with the limited purpose of the doctrine. Relation back may protect the estate or validate a proper act of administration. It does not itself confer a power to alter the shares that the law gives to beneficiaries.

Example

Assume that A dies intestate while operating a fruit-import business. Before letters of administration are extracted, B arranges the urgent sale of fresh produce belonging to the estate at its fair market value because the produce will otherwise spoil. B later becomes one of two joint administrators. B ratifies the sale, but the other administrator refuses to do so.

The starting point is that B had no authority to deal with the estate before extracting the grant. The estate vested in the Public Trustee under section 37(1) of the PAA.

The sale appears objectively beneficial because it prevented the fresh produce from spoiling and becoming worthless. The first limb in Tacplas is likely satisfied.

However, both joint administrators must ratify the transaction. Since the other administrator refused to do so, the doctrine of relation back will not validate the sale so as to bind the estate.

If B had been the sole administrator and had ratified the sale after extracting the grant, the result could be different.

Yours sincerely,

Daryl